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   Benefits from Lending Relationships in Public Debt Markets: 
Empirical Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market 
 
 
David W. Blackwell, University of Kentucky 
 
Vladimir Kotomin, Illinois State University 
 







There is a large body of literature on the benefits of established lending relationships 
with banks, which is an intermediated debt market.  We extend the literature by testing 
for benefits from direct lending relationships in the commercial paper market, which is 
a public debt market.  Diamond (1991) suggests that firms access public debt markets 
when they have enough reputation to no longer require the close monitoring by banks. 
Using daily rate data for dealer-placed and directly placed commercial paper, we find 
that the year-end liquidity squeeze is less pronounced in the directly placed commercial 
paper than in the dealer-placed commercial paper, consistent with the existence of 
benefits from direct lending relationships in this public debt market. 
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Benefits from Lending Relationships in Public Debt Markets: 
Empirical Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis has brought attention to the money markets with specific discussions 
related to their primary characteristics: low credit risk and high liquidity.  As the first signs of the 
crisis were felt in the money markets in the summer of 2007, front-page articles in the Wall Street 
Journal discussed how investors have fled commercial paper for the safety of Treasury bills as the 
Federal Reserve pumped billions of dollars of additional liquidity in the market.  Countrywide 
Financial Corporation (a large nationwide mortgage lender) was a prime example of the impact of the 
crisis on the commercial paper market as it drew on its bank lines of credit when it was unable to raise 
the necessary funds in the commercial paper market.  These articles raise the question of how 
borrowers in the commercial paper market maintain access to credit during liquidity squeezes.  
 Diamond (1989) argues that borrowers develop reputation through repeated successful debt 
transactions with a bank, which allows them to reduce their loan rate over time.  Diamond (1989) 
spawned a body of empirical literature on the value of lending relationships with the following being 
representative examples.  Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that an ongoing relationship with a lender 
increases the amount of debt available to the borrower.  Berger and Udell (1995) find that lending 
relationships reduce the rate charged to the borrower on a line of credit and reduce the need for 
collateral to support the line.  Blackwell and Winters (1997) also find that lending relationships reduce 
the rate charged on lines of credit and reduce the monitoring efforts of the lender.   
 Lending relationships may benefit lenders, too. Yasuda (2005) finds that bank relationships 
have positive and significant effects on a firm's underwriter choice, and Bharath et al. (2007) find that 
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relationship lenders’ informational advantage allows them to sell more information-sensitive products 
to its borrowers. 
Financial intermediaries such as banks do not suffer from lack of motivation to monitor their 
borrowers (as public debt market participants may) and thus are considered superior information 
producers and monitors. Diamond (1991) extends Diamond (1989) and argues that borrowers who 
develop sufficient reputation through successful transactions with a bank can leave the intermediated 
market and borrow directly in the public debt markets.  Diamond (1991) does not discuss whether 
firms that borrow in the public debt markets can benefit from developing relationships with lenders in 
these markets.  That is, can a borrower in a public debt market increase its access to debt and/or 
decrease its interest rate on debt by developing direct relationships with lenders?  We examine this 
question by testing for the benefits from direct borrower-lender relationships in the public debt market 
for commercial paper (CP). 
We take advantage of a well-defined year-end preferred habitat for liquidity (liquidity squeeze) 
(see, Griffiths and Winters (2005a)) in CP to examine whether a direct relationship with a CP 
purchaser (lender) provides better access to credit.  We find that the year-end rate increase from the 
liquidity squeeze is smaller in magnitude and shorter in duration in directly placed than in dealer-
placed CP.  The smaller size and shorter duration of the squeeze in the directly placed CP market is 
consistent with the benefits of relationship lending.  That is, borrowers who have direct relationships 
with their lenders are likely to have access to more debt at lower interest rates than other borrowers 
during periods of constrained liquidity.   
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Our results may be compared to recent research findings on investment banking relationships 
for public debt issuers.1  However, investment banks are not lenders in these studies.  We examine the 
value of borrower-lender relationships in public debt markets and find evidence to support the value of 
relationships when liquidity is constrained.    
 
2. Background 
2.1  Experimental Setting and Testable Implications 
We examine whether firms that have sufficiently good credit quality to access the short-term 
public debt markets can benefit from developing direct relationships with lenders in these markets.  
We conduct our analysis in the commercial paper (CP) market.  Here we detail why the CP market is 
an appropriate experimental setting for our analysis. 
First, borrowers in the CP market have two ways to issue their paper (borrow).  One way is 
“dealer-placed” CP which is issued by a borrowing firm and matched with an investor by a dealer. The 
second way is “directly placed” CP which is sold by a borrowing firm directly to the investor without 
the assistance of a dealer.  Thus, borrowers in the commercial paper market can work either directly 
with lenders and develop relationships with them or through dealers and remain at arm’s length from 
the lenders. 
Second, we require an experimental setting where the potential benefits of borrower-lender 
relationships have an opportunity to work.  Typically, this is accomplished with firm-level data.  For 
example, Blackwell and Winters (1997) use the number of years a borrower has been with a bank as a 
proxy for the quality of the relationship, and Athavale and Edmister (2004) examine a time series of 
loan agreements between specific borrowers and their bank. Instead, we use aggregate market data for 
 
1 Fernando, May and Megginson (2012) find no evidence of relationships creating value for debt-issuing clients of Lehman 
Brothers.  Burch, Nanda and Warther (2005) find that enhanced relationships between debt issuers and their investment 
banks lead to higher underwriting fees, consistent with a client lock-in effect.   
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dealer-placed and directly placed commercial paper. Therefore, for our empirical analysis we need 
market-level events where the benefits of direct lending relationships have an opportunity to work. 
Griffiths and Winters (2005a) find that one-month CP rates increase at the year-end in a pattern that 
they suggest is consistent with a year-end preferred habitat for liquidity (liquidity squeeze).2  Thus, the 
CP market has a regular event associated with constrained credit availability where the benefits of 
borrower-lender relationships have an opportunity to work.  
A preferred habitat for liquidity means that investors have strong maturity preferences in their 
investments so that the investments repay the investors (lenders) in time to meet their cash obligations.  
The year-end rate pattern identified by Griffiths and Winters (2005a) for 30-day commercial paper is 
that rates (1) increase at the turn of December, (2) remain abnormally high through most of December, 
and (3) return to normal across the turn of the year, with the decline beginning before the last trading 
day of the year.  This rate pattern suggests that CP lenders have a preference for paper that matures 
toward the end of December and will only lend across the turn-of-the-year at abnormally high rates.  
Thus, there is a regular year-end “squeeze” in the CP market where lenders withdraw from some 
maturity dates and instead hold cash to meet their own year-end cash obligations. This squeeze is 
accompanied by rising CP rates.   
Kane and Malkiel (1965) develop an analysis of borrower-lender relationships in an 
environment with constrained debt availability and show that banks benefit in both the short-run and 
long-run from granting the loan requests of their established customers (L-star customers).3  During 
liquidity squeezes lenders will accommodate some borrowers, but not all, and then generally at higher 
 
2 Musto (1997) also finds a year-end rate increase in the commercial paper market and suggests risk-shifting window 
dressing as the explanation.  Griffiths and Winters (2005a) show that the year-end rate change pattern in commercial paper 
is not consistent with risk-shifting window dressing. 
3 Kane and Malkiel (1965) focus on loan requests from bank customers with deposit relationships. There are no deposit 
relationships in the commercial paper market.   
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rates. The question is whether lenders would favor their regular borrowers with established 
relationships, and Kane and Malkiel (1965) provide a good reason to believe that they would.   
Stigum (1990) notes that the largest group of lenders in the commercial paper market is money 
market funds (MMFs), which account for about 40 percent of the market. In addition, Stigum states 
that the vast majority of borrowers in directly placed CP are finance companies with average amounts 
outstanding of $6.7 billion. Money market funds (the lenders) benefit from the ongoing demand of the 
finance companies (the borrowers), which allows MMFs to quickly and continually invest funds and 
avoid holding idle cash.  Avoiding idle cash is vitally important to MMFs in generating the returns 
needed to compete for investors’ dollars.  Regular interactions between direct commercial paper 
issuers and buyers (MMFs) may introduce a type of quid pro quo. One benefit direct CP issuers can 
reasonably expect for regularly absorbing cash from MMFs is being able to continue borrowing in the 
CP market during the year-end liquidity squeeze as an accommodation in their direct relationships 
with lenders. Kotomin, Smith, and Winters (2014) find that MMFs tend to have significant net 
outflows in the last two weeks of the year, as investors appear to move money into bank demand 
deposits for year-end disbursements. MMFs facing net outflows will be more selective in choosing 
investments and are likely to drop their “marginal” investments. 
Therefore, the commercial paper market provides an appropriate experimental setting for 
analyzing the potential benefits of direct lender-borrower relationships in the public debt markets.  If 
direct borrowers benefit from their relationships with lenders in the CP market, they should have 
access to more credit and/or enjoy lower rates than other borrowers during the year-end liquidity 
squeeze.  Since we work with market-level data, we cannot directly test whether direct borrowers have 
access to more credit.  However, if direct borrowers have access to more credit, the duration of the 
year-end liquidity squeeze should be shorter for them than other borrowers. In addition, when rates 
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increase prior to the year-end, we expect to find smaller rate increases for direct borrowers than for 
other borrowers. 
Before moving on, we need to explain our choice of the sample period.  In the previous section 
we cite Stigum (1990) which provides an excellent discussion of industry practices and statistics but 
may appear outdated.  However, our sample period covers from January 1983 through December 
1996.  The sample ends in 1996 because during 1997 the Fed changed the process for collecting and 
reporting CP data and no longer provided the breakdown of dealer-placed vs. directly placed CP rates.  
Accordingly, we will cite Stigum (1990) throughout this paper to provide market details characterizing 
the sample period. 
 
2.2 Important Features of the Commercial Paper Market 
 In this section we discuss institutional details of the commercial paper market that we believe 
will provide useful context for our analysis. 
 We begin with the dollar size of the market.  The volume of outstanding CP increased steadily 
from less than $194 billion at the beginning of 1984 to $775 billion at the end of 1996, the end of our 
sample period.4  The annualized rate of growth between 1984 and 1996 is over 11%.  These numbers 
suggest that the CP market was large and grew at a significant rate across our sample period. 
 Commercial paper is available in initial maturities from 1 to 270 days.  A majority of CP is 
issued with an initial maturity of 30 days or less.  Approximately 85% of CP issuers sell their paper 
through dealers.  The other 15% directly issue their CP (Stigum 1990). Traditionally, the direct issuers 
of CP are large corporations and financial institutions with significant levels of outstanding paper.   
 
4 Earlier we noted that money market funds account for about 40% of the lending in the commercial paper market.  At 
40%, money market funds would be lending $78 billion at the beginning of our sample period and $310 billion by the end 
of it. 
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 Two primary reasons exist for the use of dealers. The first is the substantial cost of establishing 
the systems and hiring the people needed to directly place CP.  The second is the time required to 
develop the relationships necessary to the success of a direct placement CP program.  Obviously, the 
issuers selling through dealers do so because dealers have the systems, people, and relationships 
needed to successfully place CP.    
  There are two primary disadvantages to using dealers to place CP.  The first one is that the 
issuer is a price taker in the dealer-placed CP market.  The dealer surveys the market each morning 
and then offers the price to the issuer.  The second disadvantage of using a dealer is that the issuer has 
no idea who holds their CP. This creates concentration risk for the issuer, which exposes it to adverse 
effects from a credit market event. Direct relationships may mitigate this risk (Kane and Malkiel 
(1965)). 
 Stigum (1990) notes that in the late 1980s (the middle of our sample period) 43% of issued CP 
by volume was placed directly.  Stigum’s Panel A of Table 22-1 (p.1060) lists the 17 largest direct 
issuers of CP and provides their CP rating and dollar amounts outstanding.  Fourteen of the 17 largest 
direct issuers of CP were rated A-1/P-1 which is the top credit rating for CP and is similar to the AA-
rating for bonds.  The three companies not receiving an A1/P1 rating were Beneficial Corp, Chrysler 
Financial, and John Deere Credit. 
 Finally, the effective annual interest rate on CP is calculated as follows: 
 Discount = Discount rate * Face * (days to maturity/360) 
 Usable funds = Face – Discount 





Fee Backup  FeeDealer  Discount ++
 
A dealer fee (typically 1/8th of a percentage point during our sample period) can be thought of as an 
underwriting fee. Directly placed CP does not pay a dealer fee. Also, the directly placed CP rate is not 
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an all-in cost of CP because it does not include the costs of systems and people to run a direct 
placement program.  These costs are substantial.  Stigum (1990) notes that to make direct placement 
economically feasible, the issuer would need to average at least $1 billion in outstanding CP.  
However, Stigum also notes that for large issuers economies of scale may result in substantial benefits. 
One large issuer calculates the cost of its direct placement program at 1 basis point.  Another issuer of 
directly placed paper suggests that if direct costs are 5 to 6 basis points, the issuer is likely better off 
going through dealers than issuing directly.  The backup fee is for the back-up line of credit from a 
bank that investors require on CP.  Dealer-placed paper typically carries 100% back-up to ensure the 
availability of credit.  Some of the large direct issuers of CP such as GMAC did not carry 100% back-
up.   
 
3. Data and Methods  
3.1 Data 
Our sample includes 3,498 average daily commercial paper rates for both 30-day and 90-day 
paper from the beginning of 1983 through the end of 1996. During this time period, CP rates were 
collected by the Federal Reserve and reported under one of two classifications: directly placed 
commercial paper and dealer-placed commercial paper. 
We chose to start our sample in 1983 to avoid the unusually volatile period in interest rates 
from October 1979 through October 1982 when the Federal Reserve experimented with targeting M1.  
We capped our sample at the end of 1996 due to a change in the way CP rates were being reported that 
took place on September 1, 1997.   Prior to that date, the Federal Reserve collected CP rates via 
survey.  The Federal Reserve would survey a sample of firms who placed their CP issues directly with 
investors, as well as a sample of dealers that employed brokers to place CP issues on behalf of firms 
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that did not sell CP directly to investors.  The Federal Reserve would then average these daily rates 
and report them as directly placed and dealer-placed commercial paper rates for the appropriate 
maturities. 
Starting on September 1, 1997 the Federal Reserve turned over the stewardship of collecting 
daily rates to the Depository Trust Company (DTC) of New York City.5  The DTC is a national 
clearinghouse for the settlement of securities trades and performs this function for nearly all domestic 
commercial paper activity.  The CP rates would be collected throughout the day, averaged, and 
electronically submitted to the Federal Reserve for reporting.  The benefits include more accurate 
reporting and savings of costs of conducting the surveys.  However, the Federal Reserve now reports 
the rates for financial and non-financial CP rather than dealer-placed and directly placed CP.  Since 
there is overlap between the two classifications, we end our sample at the end of the last full year in 
which the Federal Reserve conducted the surveys to make the comparisons needed between dealer-
placed and directly placed CP.6  
 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports basic descriptive statistics for the data used in the analysis.  Panel A provides 
average rates for each series of commercial paper data and for three-month T-bills yields.  We include 
three-month T-bill rates to provide a reference point for the commercial paper rates and because we 
use the three-month T-bill yield as a proxy for the general level of short-term interest rates.  The 
average three-month T-bill yield across the sample period is 6.155%.  We find that the average T-bill 
 
5  In May of 1997, the Federal Reserve issued a memo explaining the changes in which the commercial paper rates would 
be collected.  “A Change in the Source of Commercial Paper Data Published by the Federal Reserve System,” May 12, 
1997, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/cp.htm 
6 We have contacted the DTC about more current data.  We were told that the DTC does not archive CP data and that the 
cost of recovering old data would be prohibitive.  We have contacted researchers at the Federal Reserve about access to 
more detailed data underlying the summary data made available through the FRB data download system.  We have been 
unable to gain access to this data, which prevents the use of more current data in this study.  
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yield in December is statistically lower (albeit only at the 10% level of significance) than the average 
rate for the other eleven months, which supports the need to control for the general level of interest 
rates in later analyses.7  The average rates for 30-day dealer-placed CP increase in December, which is 
consistent with the year-end preferred habitat for liquidity in commercial paper identified by Griffiths 
and Winters (2005a).  The 30-day directly placed CP rate and the 90-day dealer-placed CP rate change 
very little, and the 90-day directly placed CP rate decreases in December, although not significantly. 
The decrease is consistent with benefits for direct lending relationships in the CP market.  
Panel B of Table 1 reports spreads between dealer-placed and directly placed commercial 
paper rates.  From January through November, the rate on 30-day dealer-placed CP is on average 
about nine basis points higher than the rate on 30-day directly placed CP.  However, in December this 
spread increases to over 23 basis points.  In the 90-day CP, the average spread from January through 
November is 17 basis points, and it increases in December to almost 30 basis points.  We draw two 
insights from these spreads.  First, in Section 2 we cited Stigum’s (1990) observation that if an issuer’s 
direct costs are 5 to 6 basis points, the issuer is likely better off going through dealers than issuing 
directly.  Our average spreads of 10 basis points on 30-day commercial paper and 18 basis points on 
90-day commercial paper are consistent with this observation.  Second, the further increase in the 
dealer-placed CP rate relative to the directly placed CP rate during the year-end liquidity squeeze is 
consistent with the value of lender-borrower relationships and suggests that these relationships have 
value even in the short-term public debt markets.  
Figure 1 plots average spreads between CP rates and the three-month T-bill rate (Panel A) and 
between dealer-placed and directly placed CP rates (Panel B) for each trading day in the year from day 
1 to 250 (i.e., these are averages over the 14 years in the sample period). We present Panel B in 
 
7  The lower December yield is surprising because both Musto (1997) and Griffiths and Winters (2005a) analyze three-
month T-bill yields for a year-end effect and both find no effect. 
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addition to Panel A because T-bills tend to have somewhat lower yields in December (see Table 1), 
and we want to ensure that the year-end effect in the dealer-place CP is not due to this decline in T-bill 
yields. It is clear from Figure 1 that changes in the spreads around the turn of the year are 
economically significant. Further analysis is needed to determine whether these changes are 
statistically significant.   
We are examining the value of lending relationships by examining the year-end preferred 
habitat for liquidity in CP.  We have market-level data.  We do not have access to firm-level data, so 
there could be concerns about differing risk between dealer-placed paper and directly placed paper.8  
Stigum (1990, figure 22-5) shows the 75.9% of CP issuers (number of issuers, not dollar volume) 
during our sample period are rated A1/P1.   Further, Stigum (1990) notes that following the failure of 
Penn Central Transportation Company (June 21, 1970) that CP lenders wanted borrowers of 
unimpeachable credit quality.  Finally, asset-backed CP was less than 10% of the total CP market until 
1995.  Accordingly, during our sample period the CP market is characterized by high quality 
borrowers of relatively homogeneous credit risk, so there is no reason to expect a systematic 
difference in risk between CP borrowers that directly place their paper and CP borrowers that place 
their paper through dealers.  We provide further details on credit risk in section 5 below.  
 
3.3 Methods of Analysis 
Griffiths and Winters (2005a) discuss that their methods allow for identifying the size and 
timing of the year-end effect in commercial paper.  Since we are also testing for the size and timing of 
 
8 The CP in our sample qualifies for the registration exemption under Section 3(a) (3) of the 1933 Securities Act.  This 
means that there are not filings with the SEC for the individual securities underlying our data.  Kacperczyk and Schnabl 
(2010) report that in 1990 about 34% of the CP market was non-financial CP with 60% in financial CP.  The remaining 6% 
was ABCP.  Financial CP is typically issued by subsidiaries of banks or captive finance companies, which do not have 
separate financial statements to allow an issuer-level analysis.  With these data restrictions any firm-level analysis would 
be severely limited and would raise concerns about generality. 
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a year-end effect in commercial paper, we apply similar methods in our analysis.  Specifically, we 
employ regressions of daily rate (spread) changes and the calculation of day-by-day average spreads 
around the end of the year. We discuss both methods in this section. 
Our first regression model is the following OLS with White’s (1980) adjustment for 
heteroskedasticity: 
                            (1) 
where: 
ΔRt = daily change (i.e., Rt – Rt-1) in commercial paper rate of a given type (dealer- or directly 
placed) and maturity (30 or 90 days), in basis points, 
 
ΔTbillt = daily change in the three-month T-bill rate, Tbillt – Tbillt-1, in basis points, 
 
JanEnd =  a 0/1 dummy that equals 1 for the last two trading days of January and 0 otherwise; 
FebEnd, MarEnd, etc. are defined similarly for other months except December, 
 
FebBgn =  a 0/1 dummy that equals 1 for the first two trading days of February and 0 otherwise; 
MarBgn, AprBgn, etc. are defined similarly for other months except January, 
 
YrEnd = 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 for the last two trading days of December and 0 
 otherwise, 
 
YrBgn = 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 for the first two trading days of January and 0 
otherwise. 
 
The time subscripts are suppressed for the dummy variables. 
Our second regression model is also an OLS with the White’s adjustment for 
heteroskedasticity: 
            (2), 
where ΔSprt is the daily change in the spread between the dealer-placed and directly placed CP of the 
same maturity, in basis points. The independent variables in Equation (2) are the turn-of-the-month 
dummy variables defined above for Equation (1). The regression models are designed to capture rate 
or spread changes at the turn of each month, including the turn of the year. The augmented Dickey-
YrBgnaYrEndaDecBgnaNovEndaFebBgnJanEndTbillaaR tt 252423223210 ++++++++= 
YrBgnaYrEndaDecBgnaNovEndaFebBgnJanEndaSprt 24232221210 +++++++= 
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Fuller test rejects the null of non-stationarity for all CP rate and spread changes. The 3-month T-bill 
yield change in Equation (1) is a control for changes in the general level of short-term interest rates.9 
To be consistent with the year-end preferred habitat for liquidity, the 30-day CP rate should go up on 
the last two days of November and/or the first two days of December (i.e., the hypothesized sign of the 
NovEnd and/or DecBgn dummies is positive) and go down on the last two days of the year and 
possibly continue to go down on the first two days of the next year (i.e., the hypothesized sign of the 
YrEnd and YrBgn dummies is negative). However, to support a preferred habitat for liquidity at the 
year-end for a 30-day instrument, spreads should remain high across December, so additional analysis 
is needed.  In particular, we compare the average spread between dealer-placed and directly placed CP 
rates for each trading day from day -25 to +5 relative to the year-end with the average spread on all 
other days. This day-to-day spread analysis allows us to examine the duration of the year-end effect. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1  Regression Analysis of Daily Commercial Paper Rate and Spread Changes 
Panel A of Table 2 provides results from four different estimations of Equation (1).  The first 
estimation is for 30-day dealer-placed commercial paper.  In this estimation the dependent variable is 
the daily change (i.e., the first difference) in the 30-day dealer-placed CP rate.  The second estimation 
is for 30-day directly placed commercial paper rate changes. The third and fourth estimations capture 
the daily rate changes in the 90-day dealer-placed and 90-day directly placed CP, respectively. 
The key calendar break points for 30-day CP are the turn of December (captured by the 
NovEnd and DecBgn dummies) and the turn of the year (the YrEnd and YrBgn dummies). In the 
 
9 Running the regressions without the T-bill yield change on the right-hand side does not affect the calendar-time results 
but causes the adjusted R-squareds of the regressions to fall notably. Since T-bill yields reported in Table 1 appear to be 
lower in December, we also ran a specification with both the T-bill change and the T-bill change interacted with the 
December variable on the right-hand side. Introducing the interaction term does not affect the results in any meaningful 
way. (The results are not reported for brevity.) 
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regression for 30-day dealer CP rate changes, the largest absolute parameter estimates are for the first 
two days of December, DecBgn, and the turn of the year, YrEnd and YrBgn. Because each dummy 
variable covers two consecutive days in a given year, their estimated coefficients are interpreted as CP 
rate changes on each of the two days covered by the dummy. For example, the 30-day dealer-placed 
CP rate increases by 2.8bps on each of the last two days of November and by 14.7bps on each of the 
first two days of December, for the total turn-of-December increase of 35bps. It then decreases by 
6.8bps on each of the last two days of the year and by 18.2bps on each of the first two days of the next 
year, for the total effect of 50bps.  This rate change pattern is consistent with the year-end preferred 
habitat for liquidity. We also observe positive coefficients at the end of March, June, and September, 
followed by negative parameters at the beginning of April, July, and October, respectively, consistent 
with some pressure to borrow at quarter-ends and abatement of such pressure after the quarter-end. 
These rate changes are much smaller in absolute values than the year-end changes.  
Directly placed 30-day CP (the second set of results in Panel A of Table 2) exhibits year-end 
rate changes similar to the dealer-placed paper: the rates increase around the turn of December and fall 
around the turn of the year.  Again, these results are consistent with a preferred habitat for liquidity at 
the year-end. The turn-of-December coefficients (NovEnd and DecBgn) indicate that the total increase 
in the rate over four days is 29.6bps (3.1bps on each of the last two days of November and 11.7bps on 
each of the first two days of December). It is slightly smaller than the total increase in the dealer-
placed 30-day CP rate of 35bps. The turn-of-the-year coefficients, YrEnd and YrBgn, are also smaller 
in absolute value than their dealer CP counterparts. The turn-of-the-year total decline in the 30-day 
direct CP rate is about 23bps (5.2bps on each of the last two days of the year, followed by 6.3bps on 
each of the first two days of the year), falling a bit short of fully offsetting the turn-of-December spike 
16 
of 29.6bps. In the dealer-placed 30-day CP, however, the total turn-of-the-year rate decline of 50bps 
exceeds the turn-of-December spike of 35bps.  
Combined with Figure 1, the results of the first two regressions suggest that the 30-day dealer-
placed CP rate increases not only around the turn of December but also later in the month, while 
directly placed paper rates spike only at the turn of December. Both types of CP rates then return to 
“normal”, pre-December, levels after the turn of the year. The additional increase in the dealer CP 
rates later in December is consistent with borrowers facing more difficulty in placing their paper 
during the year-end liquidity squeeze. The direct CP issuers do not face this additional pressure, which 
is consistent with the benefits of direct lending relationships. The analysis of day-by-day spreads in the 
next subsection (4.2) will help determine whether it is the case.   
The third set of results in Panel A of Table 2 is for the changes in the 90-day dealer-placed CP 
rate. There are no significant rate increases at the beginning of October (when the 90-day maturity 
starts spanning the end of the year) or December.10 The end-of-November increase of 3.7bps per day 
on two days is more than offset by significant rate declines around the turn of the year, suggesting a 
preceding increase that may be too gradual to be fully captured by dummy variables covering only 
four days at turns of months. 
The last set of results in Panel A of Table 2 is for 90-day directly placed CP rate changes. 
There is a slight increase in the rates on the last two days of November but no significant rate changes 
around the end of the year. It is consistent with direct borrowers in the 90-day CP market not facing a 
 
10 Because 90 calendar days is usually less than three months, we have also run the 90-day CP regressions with the dummy 
variable covering the last two trading days before the 90-day CP maturity starts to span the end of the year in place of 
SepEnd and the dummy variable covering the first two days after the 90-day CP maturity starts to span the end of the year 
in place of OctBgn. These alternative dummy variables always have statistically insignificant coefficients, and do not seem 
to affect other estimated parameters; therefore, we choose to retain SepEnd and OctBgn variables in the regression results 
we report. 
17 
liquidity squeeze to the same degree as dealer-placed and directly placed CP issuers in the 30-day CP 
as well as dealer-placed CP issuers in the 90-day CP.    
Panel B of Table 2 supplements the results in Panel A by reporting the output of Equation (2) 
for changes in the spreads between dealer-placed and directly placed commercial paper rates. It is 
designed to determine if the relationships developed through placing CP directly significantly reduce 
the rate impact of the year-end liquidity squeeze for the borrowers in this market. If they do, we would 
expect positive parameter estimates on NovEnd and/or DecBgn followed by negative parameter 
estimates on YrEnd and/or YrBgn in the 30-day paper.  We find that NovEnd, DecBgn, and YrEnd are 
insignificant, while YrBgn is negative and significant at the 10% level in the 30-day maturity.  As to 
the spread between 90-day dealer- and directly placed CP rates (the last column in Table 2), it does not 
increase around the turn of October or December but decreases significantly both on the last two and 
the first two trading days of the year.11 
Our regressions apparently do not fully capture the build-up in the rates and spreads prior to 
the end of the year. To supplement our regression analysis and to take a deeper look at the month of 
December and the turn of the year, we now turn to the day-by-day spread analysis for trading days -25 
to +5 relative to the year-end. 
 
4.2 Day-by-day Analysis of Commercial Paper Spreads around the Turn of the Year 
Our regression results are consistent with a year-end preferred habitat for liquidity.  However, 
to fully support a preferred habitat at the year-end in 30-day commercial paper, the rate increase at the 
 
11 The results in Panel B are somewhat redundant. Since spread changes are simply differences between the respective rate 
changes (e.g., a 30-day spread change is the change in the 30-day dealer CP rate minus the change in the 30-day direct CP 
rate), the coefficients in the first (second) column of Panel B are roughly the differences between the coefficients in the 
first and second (third and fourth) output columns in Panel A.  
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turn-of-December must persist across the month.  The day-by-day spread analysis allows us to 
determine if it occurs and also to determine if the relationship effect exists in directly placed CP.   
 Table 3 presents four sets of spreads for trading days -25 to + 5 relative to the year-end.  The 
spreads are between 30-day dealer-placed CP and three-month T-bill rates, 30-day directly placed CP 
and three-month T-bill rates, 30-day dealer-placed and directly placed CP rates , and 90-day dealer-
placed and directly placed CP rates, respectively. We first compute each of these spreads for each 
trading day in our sample. Then for each trading day from -25 to +5 relative to the year-end (our 
chosen turn-of-the-year window) we calculate the average daily spread over the sample period (e.g., 
the average dealer-direct 30-day CP spread on day -25 is the average of all such spreads on day -25 
over the 14-year study period). There is no day 0. We then employ a two-tailed t-test for mean equality 
between the average spread on each day in the turn-of-the-year window and the average spread on 
“regular” days (all the days not in the turn-of-the-year window of days-25 to +5 relative to the year-
end). We report the test results in the table. For instance, the average spread between 30-day dealer-
placed CP and three-month T-bill rate on day -14 relative to the year-end is 76.9bps, which is different 
from the average spread on “regular” days of 49.9bps (reported in the first row) at the 1% level.  
 The day-by-day spreads over the T-bill rate reported in Table 3 suggest that the year-end 
liquidity squeeze results in sustained spread increases throughout December in both dealer-placed and 
directly placed CP over T-bills.12 The month of December has 20, 21 or 22 business days.  Thus, the 
dramatic increase in the spreads around trading day -21 roughly coincides with the first business day 
of December, which is consistent with the regression results reported in Panel A of Table 2.  Also, 
note that we are examining a 30-day instrument and not a one-month instrument, so investors buying 
30-day CP on the last trading day of November would be buying securities maturing on December 30.  
 
12 This result is not driven by a slight decline in the three-month T-bill rate prior to the end of the year (see Table 1). 
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Commercial paper maturing on December 30 provides liquidity before the end of the year because CP 
transactions settle in immediately available funds.  
The spread increases in 30-day direct CP rate over the T-bill rate (the second set of spreads 
reported in Table 3) are smaller than the spread increases in the dealer-placed CP rates over the T-bill 
rate. To determine whether the dealer-direct CP spread increases significantly prior to the end of the 
year, we turn to the last two columns of Table 3. We observe that the dealer-direct CP spreads are 
abnormally high across December.  They are both statistically and economically larger than the 
average spreads on all other days (reported in the top row).  The spreads return to normal levels by the 
beginning of the New Year in both maturities. Notice that the spread is also consistently above 
“normal” on most of days in December even in the 90-day maturity. That is, during the year-end 
liquidity squeeze in the commercial paper market, the rates on dealer-placed CP increase significantly 
more than the rates on directly placed CP in both 30-day and 90-day maturities.  It suggests that 
benefits exist in the commercial paper market from developing direct relationships with lenders. 
Panel A of Figure 2 plots differences in the average spread between 30-day commercial paper 
rates and three-month T-bill rates on each of the trading days from -25 to +5 and the average spread on 
all other days. Panel B of Figure 2 plots similarly defined spread differences between dealer-placed 
and directly placed CP rates. That is, we take the spreads on days from -25 to +5 in Table 3 and 
subtract the spread on “regular” days from them. That is, the spread difference on Day -20 for the 
spread between 30-day dealer-place CP and three-month T-bill rates in Figure 2A appears to be just 
below 30bps. Referring to the first column of spreads in Table 3, we see that the average spread on 
Day -20 between the 30-day dealer-place CP and three-month T-bill rates is 78.6bps and the average 
spread on  all other (“regular”) days is 49.9bps; the difference in the spreads is 28.7bps, which is what 
we see in the figure.  
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Overall, the results for 30-day commercial paper suggest that the year-end liquidity squeeze is 
present in both dealer-placed and directly placed paper. However, the magnitude of the effect is 
economically and statistically smaller in the directly placed CP, consistent with the benefits from 
direct lender-borrower relationships in this short-term public debt market. Analysis of the spreads 
between 90-day dealer-placed and directly placed CP rates corroborates the 30-day results. 
 
5. Potential Concerns, Data Limitations and a Post-Crisis Comment 
Our results are based on market-level data.  Firm-specific data are not currently available.  
Thus, reasonable concerns exist that the findings are driven by dealer-placed CP issuers being 
different from direct CP issuers (e.g., in terms of industries, credit quality, or size).  We discuss the 
concerns and explain why we believe the overall CP market is sufficiently homogeneous relative to 
firm-specific factors for us to draw conclusions from market-level data.  
First, directly placed CP was dominated by financial issuers (bank subsidiaries and captive 
finance companies) during our study period, a potential concern is that investors may consider 
financial CP safer, more liquid, or both, implying that the spread between directly and dealer-placed 
CP rates could be explained by differences in issuers’ characteristics rather than by lending 
relationships. To alleviate this concern, we examine the spreads between AA-rated financial and AA-
rated non-financial CP rates in the first six years after the end of our sample, 1997-2002 (the Fed has 
reported financial and non-financial CP rates since 1997). The average spread for the 30-day (90-day) 
CP is 1.6 (2.5) basis points.  Thus, the financial CP rates are, on average, higher than rates on similarly 
rated non-financial paper, which is inconsistent with financial CP being perceived as safer, or more 
liquid, than non-financial paper. It also means that it is harder to find relationship benefits for direct 
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issuers if financial firms (who dominated the direct CP market) have to offer slightly higher yields 
than similarly rated non-financial issuers.13  
Second, credit quality of most issuers in the CP market is high or very high. Investors in the 
money markets are concerned with the return of principal more than the return on principal, due to the 
temporary nature of their excess cash. More than 95% of issuers have been in the top two CP rating 
categories, A1/P1 and A2/P2. Firms with lower credit quality will have to borrow short-term funds 
from intermediaries such as banks. Of course, the A2/P2-rated paper has higher yields than the A1/P1-
rated paper. Griffiths and Winters (2005b) find that the spread between 30-day A2/P2 and A1/P1-rated 
paper increases at the turn of December, consistent with the higher price of credit risk during periods 
of constrained liquidity. However, this credit spread does not show an additional increase later in 
December, unlike the spread between the dealer-placed and directly placed paper reported in the 
present study. It is hard to conceive that dealer-placed paper becomes systematically more risky in 
December and December only, compared to directly placed paper. Therefore, we believe that our 
results are not driven by credit risk. 
Third, when it comes to the issuer size, usually only the largest issuers are able to access the 
CP market. Only 500 to 1500 firms have had outstanding commercial paper at any given time over the 
last few decades. As to the issue size, it is more likely that firms that regularly place large CP issues 
have an in-house CP operation rather than place their paper through dealers. Issue size is typically 
related to liquidity. However, it is well known that investors usually buy commercial paper with the 
intent to hold it to maturity. In case holders need to sell it before maturity, they often can sell it back to 
the issuer of directly placed paper or to the dealer of dealer-placed paper. Thus, the commitment of the 
issuer or the dealer to buy the paper back is more important than the issue size.  Consistent with this 
 
13 We note that Stigum (1990) suggests that a 5bps to 10 bps spread in the money markets is an attractive arbitrage 
opportunity.  Accordingly, the spread between AA non-financial CP and AA financial CP is not economically different. 
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argument, Whitledge and Winters (2015) examine rates on large-bank CDs sold to money market 
funds and find that CD rates do not vary with the size of the CD.   
Finally, we motivate the paper with the liquidity squeeze in the commercial paper market 
during the financial crisis to provide the current relevance of the paper, but we do our analysis on an 
older sample due to data limitations.  Specifically, the rate data on dealer-placed and directly placed 
CP end in 1997.  However, some post-crisis data on dealer-placed and directly placed CP is available.  
Specifically, weekly amounts outstanding of dealer-placed versus directly placed commercial paper 
are available through 2012 from the Federal Reserve.   
Panel A of Figure 3 provides amounts outstanding of dealer-placed and directly placed non-
financial CP, while Panel B of Figure 3 provides amounts outstanding for dealer-placed and directly 
placed financial CP.  Both show a dramatic decline in the total amounts outstanding across the 
financial crisis and continuing through the 2009 recessionary period.  Toward the end of 2009 Panel A 
shows an upturn in the total amounts outstanding while Panel B shows a halt in the decline.  In both 
figures the tide was stemmed by a dramatic increase in the amounts outstanding in directly placed CP. 
These results suggest that as the economic recovery in the U.S. started at the end of 2009 the 
CP issuers moved strongly into directly placed CP and were able to access credit in both the non-
financial and financial CP markets.  Our results are consistent with direct relationships providing more 
reliable access to credit and suggest that relationships continue to have value in the post-crisis CP 
markets.   
     
6. Conclusion 
 Previous empirical literature has identified benefits for direct lending relationships with banks.  
Diamond (1989) suggests these benefits are derived from the borrower developing a positive 
23 
reputation with the lender.  Diamond (1991) suggests that some borrowers develop sufficient 
reputation to move beyond the intermediated bank lending market to public debt markets, such as 
commercial paper.  Griffiths and Winters (2005a) identify a year-end preferred habitat for liquidity in 
the commercial paper (CP) market.  In addition, the CP market is segmented into dealer-placed and 
directly placed paper, which provides a natural experimental setting for us to examine whether direct 
lending relationships have value for businesses with sufficient reputation to access the public debt 
markets. 
 We show that both 30-day dealer-placed and 30-day directly placed CP have year-end rate 
changes consistent with a year-end liquidity squeeze.  That is, when money market investors increase 
their demand for liquidity, borrowers in both the dealer-placed and directly placed CP markets pay 
higher rates.  However, further analysis shows that the rate increases in the directly placed CP market 
are smaller than in the dealer-place CP market.  We find corroborating evidence for the benefits of 
direct lending relationships in the market for 90-day CP.  Finally, analysis on post-crisis CP amounts 
outstanding supports that relationship continue to have value.  
 In summary, our research question is whether benefits exist from direct borrower-lender 
relationships in public debt markets where borrowers have sufficient credit reputations to overcome 
the need for intermediated (bank) debt.  Our results suggest that such benefits do exist in the form of 
smaller rate increases during periods of constrained liquidity in public debt markets. 
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Panel A. Mean Commercial Paper and Three-month T-bill Rates, 1983-1996. 










Entire sample period 6.686 6.588 6.699 6.515 6.155 
January - November 6.673 6.588 6.703 6.530 6.173 
December 6.828 6.585 6.660 6.356 5.957* 
 
 
Panel B. Spread between Dealer-placed and Directly placed Commercial Paper Rates 
Average Spread, % 30-day  90-day  
Entire sample period 0.099 0.185 
January - November 0.087 0.174 
December 0.234*** 0.296*** 
 
***, **, * December statistics is significantly different from January-November statistics at the 1%, 





Table 2. Panel A presents the regression output for daily commercial paper rate changes (Equation 1): 
 
The four regressions in Panel A are for the changes (in bps) in the 30-day dealer-placed commercial paper rates, 
30-day directly placed commercial paper rates,  90-day dealer-placed commercial paper rates, and 90-day 
directly placed commercial paper rates.                                                                                                                                                                            
Panel B presents the regression output for daily changes in the spread between dealer-placed and directly placed 
commercial paper rates (Equation 2):  
 
The two regressions in Panel B are for the changes (in bps) in the 30-day spread and the 90-day spread. 
ΔTbill is the change in the 3-month T-bill yield in basis points; JanEnd is a dummy variable that equals 1 on the 
last two trading days of January, and so on for the end of every month except December; FebBgn is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 on the first two trading days of February, and so on for the beginning of every month 
except January; YrEnd is a dummy variable that equals 1 on the last two trading days of the year, and YrBgn is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 on the first two trading days of the year. 
The regressions are OLS with the White’s adjustment. The estimation period is 1983-1996.   














Intercept -0.1 -0.3  0.0 -0.1   0.2  0.1 
ΔTbill  0.3***  0.4***  0.3***  0.2***  --- --- 
JanEnd  1.0*  2.5  0.1  0.4  -1.6 -0.2 
FebBgn -0.4  0.0 -0.2  0.4  -0.5 -0.5 
FebEnd  2.0*  2.2  0.9  1.1  -0.3 -0.2 
MarBgn  1.6** 1.6  1.3**  0.6   0.0  0.8 
MarEnd  2.1**  0.1  1.2 -0.4   2.0  1.5 
AprBgn -2.1**  1.7 -1.4**  1.2  -3.8** -2.5*** 
AprEnd  1.3  3.2***  0.7  0.6  -1.9**  0.1 
MayBgn  1.0  2.0**  0.6  0.3  -1.1*  0.4 
MayEnd  1.7**  1.3  1.9**  1.5   0.4  0.5 
JunBgn  0.6*** -0.3 -0.8 -1.3   1.0  0.4 
JunEnd  1.9*** -1.1  0.9  0.6   3.1  0.2 
JulBgn -3.3*** -1.6 -2.6** -3.6*  -1.7  1.0 
JulEnd  0.7 -0.1  0.3 -0.1   0.8  0.4 
AugBgn  1.2  3.4**  1.2  0.7  -2.1*  0.4 
AugEnd  0.8 -0.1  0.3  0.9  -1.0* -0.6 
SepBgn  1.7***  3.9***  1.6**  0.6  -2.2***  0.9 
SepEnd  3.4***  6.4*  2.4**  1.0  -2.9  1.4 
OctBgn -3.6*** -2.3*** -0.2  1.2  -1.4 -1.4 
OctEnd -0.1 -0.6 -0.9  0.6   0.5 -1.5 
NovBgn  0.5  0.5 -0.2 -0.2   0.0  0.1 
NovEnd  2.8*  3.5***  4.2*  2.8**  -0.6  1.2 
DecBgn 14.7*** 11.8***  0.1  0.0   2.7  0.3 
YrEnd -6.8* -5.2** -5.6** -1.0  -1.6 -4.6** 
YrBgn -18.2*** -6.3*** -7.0*** -1.0  -12.0* -5.8* 
        
F-stat 29.3*** 13.8*** 22.9*** 7.6***  3.4*** 2.0*** 
Adj. R2 16.9% 8.4% 13.7% 4.5%  1.6% 0.7% 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
ttt YrBgnaYrEndaDecBgnaNovEndaFebBgnJanEndTbillaaR  +++++++++= 252423223210
tt YrBgnaYrEndaDecBgnaNovEndaFebBgnJanEndaaSpr  ++++++++= 24232221210
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Table 3. Spreads on Days -25 to +5 relative to the end of the year and all other (“regular”) days. 
We first compute the spread between each of the two types of CP rates and the three-month T-bill rate as well 
as between the two different types of CP rates, dealer-placed and directly placed paper, in the 30-day and 90-
day maturities, for each trading day in our sample period, 1983-1996. Then for each trading day from -25 to +5 
relative to the year-end (our chosen turn-of-the-year window) we calculate the average daily spread over the 
sample period (e.g., the average dealer-direct 30-day CP spread on day -25 is the average of all such spreads on 
day -25 over the 14-year study period), as well as the average spread on all other (“regular”) days.  
 Average Spreads, bps 
Trading Day 
relative to Y-end 
CP – 3-month T-bill Dealer CP– Direct CP 
30-day Dealer 30-day Direct 30-day 
 
90-day 
“Regular” days 49.9 41.3 8.6 17.4 
-25 44.1 32.9 13.1* 14.0 
-24 43.6 29.4 12.6* 20.8 
-23 47.7 33.7 14.0*** 23.4* 
-22 48.5 34.9 13.1** 25.6** 
-21 71.6*** 50.5 21.1*** 22.7 
-20 78.6*** 57.0* 21.6*** 22.9* 
-19 78.3*** 57.1* 21.2*** 24.1* 
-18 73.7*** 60.9** 12.8** 24.8** 
-17 71.9*** 57.6* 14.2*** 27.7*** 
-16 74.8*** 60.4** 14.4*** 26.1*** 
-15 74.4*** 61.6** 12.8** 27.7*** 
-14 76.9*** 59.7** 17.1*** 28.1*** 
-13 77.6*** 61.7** 15.9*** 28.4*** 
-12 81.0*** 66.2*** 14.8*** 31.1*** 
-11 84.9*** 64.6*** 20.3*** 30.5*** 
-10 90.1*** 68.1*** 22.0*** 32.4*** 
-9 89.7*** 68.6*** 21.1*** 31.7*** 
-8 92.4*** 67.9*** 24.5*** 27.9*** 
-7 98.4*** 75.5*** 22.9*** 34.4*** 
-6 101.2*** 71.5*** 29.7*** 29.9*** 
-5 101.9*** 65.2*** 30.2*** 32.4*** 
-4 106.6*** 68.9*** 37.6*** 34.5*** 
-3 107.6*** 67.4*** 40.2*** 39.1*** 
-2 106.2*** 63.4*** 42.6*** 36.3*** 
-1 94.9*** 57.5* 37.4*** 29.9*** 
+1 59.9 55.5* 4.4*** 17.8 
+2 54.4 43.8 10.6 19.1 
+3 51.9 40.0 11.9* 18.6 
+4 49.7 39.4 10.3 16.4 
+5 46.8 35.3 11.5 14.5 
***, **, and * denote that the average spread on a given day in the turn-of-the-year window is significantly 
different (using a two-tailed t-test) from the average spread on “regular” (all other) days (reported in the first 
row) at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
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Figure 1. Average Intrayear Spreads 











Figure 2.  Differences between the average daily spread on each of the trading days 
from -25 through +5 relative to the year-end and the average daily spread on all other 
trading days, 1983-1996, in basis points.  Day -1 is the last trading day of the year, and 
day +1 is the first trading day of the new year. 
 










Figure 3. Outstanding Commercial Paper, January 2001 – June 2012. 
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